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THE INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN LOUISIANA
I. INTRODUCTION
A drunk driver careens down the highway at an excessive rate of
speed, weaving in and out of his lane. He finds himself behind a slow
moving vehicle which he is determined to pass. He swerves into the
opposite lane to see if he can pass the vehicle in front of him. As a
result of his intoxicated state, the driver thinks that he can pass the
car ahead of him without colliding head-on with the oncoming car he
sees in the distance. He pulls into the left lane and accelerates, but the
alcohol has dimmed his perceptions. The oncoming car is upon the
intoxicated driver too quickly, and a violent head-on collision ensues.
The driver of the car which the drunk driver hit head-on brings suit
against the intoxicated driver, claiming compensatory damages for the
actual harm she has sustained as well as demanding the recovery of
punitive damages.
At trial the defendant is found guilty of wanton negligence and the
jury awards the plaintiff $30,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000
in punitive damages. The defendant has an automobile insurance policy
with liability coverage up to $50,000, yet the insurance company refuses
to pay the $5,000 of punitive damages. The obvious question then arises:
Under the "standard" automobile liability policy will the insurance
company be legally obligated to pay its insured's punitive damages under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4?'
This comment will delve into the issue of the insurability of punitive
damages rendered against an insured in Louisiana. First, a brief glimpse
at the background of punitive damages will be taken. Then this comment
will consider the issues involved in the question of the insurability of
punitive damages. An analysis will be made as to whether the language
of a standard automobile liability insurance policy will permit coverage
of these damages. Next, the public policy issues surrounding insurance
coverage of punitive damage awards will be discussed. Finally, the
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1. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.4 provides:
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be awarded
upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were caused by a
wanton or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others by a defendant
whose intoxication while operating a motor vehicle was a cause in fact of the
resulting injuries.
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comment will discuss whether or not Louisiana courts should allow the
insuring against punitive damages.
II. BACKGROUND
The doctrine of punitive damages, was first developed in the eight-
eenth century common law of England. The case of Huckle v. Money3
is generally considered as the earliest jurisprudential reference to punitive
damages. Although punitive damages were used by some courts to punish
and deter, 4 they were also used by many courts to compensate plaintiffs
who were unable to recover for non-pecuniary damages such as mental
anguish.' Thus, when the concept of punitive damages found its way
into the jurisprudence of the United States, courts were divided as to
its purpose and use.
In Louisiana, references can be found to punitive damages as far
back as the 1836 case of Summers v. Baumgard,6 in which the defendant
was accused of illegally seizing and detaining the plaintiff's horse and
dray. The court in determining that the defendant should be assessed
punitive damages for his acts stated:
The necessity of seizing the horse and dray in the first instance,
in order to get possession of his truant apprentice boy, is not
very obvious; but the detention of them after repeated demands,
and the offer on the part of the plaintiff to give him ample
security to make good any damage for which he might be justly
liable, evince such an obstinate determination on the part of
the defendant to take justice into his own hands, as fully au-
thorized the jury to make him pay something in the shape of
smart money. 7
The Summers case involving wrongful seizure can be contrasted with
Hill v. The New Orleans, Opelousas and Great Western Railroad Co.,'
2. Punitive damages are also known as exemplary damages, vindictive damages and
smart money. See Boulard v. Calhoun, 13 La. Ann. 445, 448 (1858).
3. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). Huckle involved an action for trespass, assault
and false imprisonment arising out of the plaintiff's arrest by the defendant. Although
the plaintiff had only been imprisoned for a short time and had not been mistreated,
the jury awarded a verdict of 300 pounds. The defendant's motion for a new trial on
the grounds of excessive damages was refused by Lord Camden who stated that in view
of the abuse of power by the defendant, an officer of the king, the jury had "done
right in giving exemplary damages." Id. at 769.
4. See Grey v. Grant, 95 Eng. Rep. 794 (K.B. 1764).
5. See Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S.W. 351 (1855); Benson
v. Frederick, 97 Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B. 1766).
6. 9 La. 161 (1836).
7. Id. at 163.
8. 11 La. Ann. 292 (1856).
1162 [Vol. 48
COMMENTS
which was a personal injury case. Suit was brought to recover damages
from the company for injuries sustained by the plaintiff. The plaintiff,
a passenger on the railroad, was injured when the engineer ran over a
blind horse on the tracks. This collision caused injury to Hill, who
either jumped or was thrown from the car. In discussing whether the
defendant company should be liable for punitive damages, the court
stated that "[iln actions of this kind it is not within the province of
the jury, although the negligence is clearly proven, to give -vindictive
damages, as is sometimes allowed in cases of wilful or malicious in-
juries. '" 9 Thus, courts draw the apparent distinction between personal
injury cases and certain cases involving property rights, cases which
would now be brought under theories of wrongful seizure and mental
anguish. Punitive damages were not permitted in the former situation,
whereas such damages were permitted in the wrongful seizure cases.
Since the driver in Hill was found to be negligent, but not to have
intentionally caused the accident, no punitive damages were awarded.
Some years later, in McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co.,1O the
Louisiana Supreme Court articulated the state's position regarding pu-
nitive damages. McCoy involved a dispute in which landowners sued
the defendant alleging that the casing on defendant's gas well had broken
because of the negligence of the defendant, which resulted in a leakage
of gas. In their petition, the plaintiffs charged that their gas rights had
been impaired and the subsurface structure of their land was damaged,
causing the plaintiffs serious harm. In discussing the plaintiffs' claim
for punitive damages, the court stated that in Louisiana punitive damages
could not be granted in any case unless the damages could be assessed
for some particular wrong for which punitive damages have been ex-
pressly provided for by statute." The court, finding no statute permitting
9. Id. at 294.
10. 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383 (1932).
11. Id. at 385-86. For other references to punitive damages in early Louisiana juris-
prudence, see Patterson v. New Orleans & C.R., Light & Power Co., 110 La. 797, 34
So. 782 (1903) (punitive damages not allowed in personal injury suit where plaintiff, a
passenger on the defendant's streetcar was injured when the driver of the defendant's
streetcar struck another streetcar, even though driver of defendant's streetcar was intox-
icated); Bentley v. Fischer Lumber & Mfg. Co., 51 La. Ann. 451, 25 So. 262 (1899)
(punitive damages allowed for building on plaintiff's land a levee which was subsequently
destroyed by a mob, and for destruction of plaintiff's crops in the ensuing flood); Graham
v. St. Charles St. R.R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1656, 18 So. 707 (1895) (punitive damages not
allowed against railroad whose foreman threatened to fire any employee who frequented
the plaintiff's store); Edwards v. Ricks, 30 La. Ann. 926 (1878) (punitive damages not
allowed against heirs of deceased tortfeasor who took plaintiff's house); Burkett v. Lanata,
15 La. Ann. 337 (1860) (punitive damages allowed for malicious arrest and imprisonment);
Boulard v. Calhoun, 13 La. Ann. 445 (1858) (punitive damages not allowed for burning
of a house by defendant's slave); and Grant v. McDonogh, 7 La. Ann. 447 (1852) (punitive
damages allowed for flooding of plaintiff's property by defendant in two successive years).
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punitive damages nor any right or cause of action, dismissed the plain-
tiff's claim. However, in 1984 the Louisiana legislature imposed, by
statute, sanctions of punitive damages for the wanton and reckless
handling of toxic substances, and also for the wanton disregard for the
safety of others by an intoxicated driver whose intoxication was a cause
in fact of the plaintiff's injuries. 12
Although Louisiana now has statutes which provide for punitive
damage awards, the issue of whether insurance should be allowed to
cover this liability is unresolved. Currently, twenty-one states allow the
insurability of punitive damages,13 while six states permit insuring against
punitive damages in situations of vicarious liability only, 14 and eight
states have taken the position that such damages are not insurable. 5
Additionally, five states do not recognize punitive damages at all, 16 and
ten states have not yet resolved the issue of the insurability of punitive
damages. 17
III. IssuEs INVOLVED IN THE INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE
AWARDS
The insurability of punitive damages involves two basic issues: 1)
Does the language of the automobile insurance contract cover such
damages; and 2) If the insurance contract language does permit the
insurance of such damages, will the contract be deemed void as against
public policy?
12. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.3 added by 1984 La. Acts No. 335 § 1 provides: "In
addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be awarded, if it is
proved that plaintiff's injuries were caused by the defendant's wanton or reckless disregard
for public safety in the storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic subst-
ances." For the text of La. Civ. Code art. 2315.4, which was added by 1984 La. Acts
No. 511, § 1, see note supra 1.
13. Those states allowing the insurability of punitive damages are: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Car-
olina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See Schumaier & McKinsey,
The Insurability of Punitive Damages, 71 A.B.A. J. 68 (Mar. 1, 1986).
14. States allowing insurance of punitive damages in situations of vicarious liability
only are: Florida, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania. Id.
15. The states which do not permit such insurance are: California, Colorado, Kansas,
Maine, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota and Ohio. Id.
16. Those states which do not recognize punitive damages are: Massachusetts, Mi-
chigan, Nebraska, Virginia and Washington. Id.
17. Those states in which the issue is unresolved are: Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming. Id.
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A. Does the Automobile Insurance Policy Language Permit the
Coverage of Punitive Damages?
The leading case in favor of the insurability of punitive damages
is the Tennessee case of Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance
Co.i" In this case, the insurance policy in question had language which
is very similar to most standard automobile liability policies. The policy
under scrutiny in Lazenby provided coverage as follows: "Coverage A-
Bodily Injury Liability. To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of bodily injury ... caused by accident and arising out of ownership,
maintenance or use of the automobile."' 19 In resolving the issue of
whether the insurance contract language could be construed to provide
for coverage of punitive damages, the Tennessee Supreme Court found
that most courts have construed the language in similar liability policies
to cover both compensatory and punitive damages. 20 The court further
reasoned that since much of the jurisprudence has construed such policy
language to cover punitive damages, then the average policyholder read-
ing such language would expect to be protected against all claims which
were not intentionally inflicted. 21
This argument rests on the premise that the punitive damages arise
as a result of the physical injuries sustained in an automobile accident.
Covered damages are those which the insured is legally obligated to pay
because of bodily injury caused by the accident and arising out of the
use of the automobile. 22 Therefore, under this theory, punitive damages
fall within the policy language. Even if punitive damages are not clearly
within that language, the policy still must be construed in favor of the
18. 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964).
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id. at 5. Indeed, in most cases where courts have faced the issue of the insurability
of punitive damages, they have determined that punitive damages are insurable under the
policy language. See Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir.
1934); Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972);
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969);
Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d 910 (1977)
(wrongful removal of grave marker); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146
(Ky. 1973) (gross negligence resulting in assault); Anthony v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867 (Miss.
1981); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); and Dairyland
County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). See also
Annotation, Liability Insurance Coverage as Extending to Liability for Punitive or Ex-
emplary Damages, 16 A.L.R. 4th 11 (1982).
21. Lazenby, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
22. See Carroway v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 908 (S.C. 1965) (obligation of an insurer
under an automobile liability policy requiring it to pay all sums which the insured should




insured when there is an ambiguity. 2 Another argument in favor of
finding coverage is that, given the insurance policy's failure to specifically
exclude punitive damages, it is the intent of the insurance company to
insure its policyholders against punitive damages. 24
The argument against construing the policy language to protect the
insured against punitive damages is best illustrated in the landmark case
of Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty.25 In this case, a
drunk driver, traveling at a high rate of speed while attempting to pass
the automobile in front of him, lost control of his vehicle and smashed
into the rear of McNulty's car. The intoxicated driver had an insurance
policy which was very similar to that in Lazenby,26 and the insurance
company refused to pay the judgment for punitive damages. In denying
its liability for this part of the judgment, the insurance company urged
that a claim for punitive damages was not one for "bodily injury"
because "by definition punitive damages go beyond compensation for
bodily injury."'2 7 It further asserted that the "wilful, reckless or wantonly
negligent conduct" of the defendant necessary under Florida law as a
predicate for the granting of punitive damages is essentially an intentional
tort which is expressly excluded under all insurance policies as being
against public policy. 28 The court agreed with the insurance company's
argument and held that under Florida and Virginia law, 29 public policy
23. See R. Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law § 6.3(a) at 351 (1977). The insured
is covered according to this argument, provided that the total of the compensatory and
punitive damages falls within the policy coverage limits.
24. See, e.g., Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981) (which held
that (1) public policy in West Virginia does not preclude insurance coverage for punitive
damages arising from gross, reckless or wanton negligence and (2) plaintiffs may recover
punitive damages awarded against the insured upon gross, reckless or wanton negligence).
Also in support of the notion that the policy language provides coverage of punitive
damages is Appleman who has stated, "it is clear that the average insured contemplates
protection against claims of any character caused by his operation of an automobile, not
intentionally inflicted." 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 132, § 4312 (1962), in
Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d at 1015.
25. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
26. 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964). The McNulty policy provided that the insurer agreed
"[t1o pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of: A. bodily injury . . ." 307 F.2d at 433. The
policy excluded coverage for "bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by
or at the direction of the insured." Id.
27. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 433. See also the definition of punitive damages in Re-
statement (Second) of Torts 2d § 908, at 464: "Punitive damages are damages, other
than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future."
28. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 433-34.
29. See infra note 51.
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prohibited construction of the automobile liability policy to cover liability
for punitive damages.
Under this theory, punitive damages are assessed against a defendant
whose conduct is so 'morally reprehensible that it is likened to an
intentional tort. Since it is closely akin to an intentional tort, and since
the insured's conduct is so morally reprehensible, coverage should be
denied under the policy language.
The issue of whether the language of a liability policy would cover
punitive damages has been addressed several times in Louisiana. In
Fagot v. Ciravola,30 the question was whether or not insurance should
cover an award of punitive damages in a section 198331 action. The
plaintiff was arrested without probable cause by the two defendants,
and the jury subsequently assessed the defendants with $10,000 general
damages and $10,000 punitive damages.
The professional liability policy in question provided that "[tihe
company will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of, but not
limited to, negligent acts. .... "32 The policy provided coverage for per-
sonal injury claims and included in the definitions of personal injury
were false arrest, battery, assault, libel, slander, and "deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws of ihe United States .... -93 In construing the policy, Judge Rubin
determined that the policy language would be "highly misleading" if
the policy was not intended to provide insurance for jury awards of
punitive damages. Therefore, he concluded that, as a matter of law,
the policy as issued covered punitive damages.3 4
The second case dealing with this issue is the state trial court decision
of Beard v. Allstate," which was recently handed down. In that case,
the triai court, in construing an automobile liability policy, determined
that the policy language did provide for the coverage of punitive dam-
30. 445 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1978).
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1981) provides:
Every person who under color of any statute ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Under § 1983, punitive damages are a permissible award.
32. Fagot, 445 F. Supp. at 344.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 16th Judicial Court, No. 59, 872 Div. G.
19881 1167
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ages. In making this determination, the trial court used the presumption
that ambiguous insurance contracts are to be construed in favor of
providing coverage for the insured.
The third opinion facing the issue of the insurability of punitive
damages in Louisiana is the recent decision of Creech v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. 36 In this case, the plaintiff was suing for exemplary damages
as a result of an automobile accident with an intoxicated driver insured
by Aetna. The court of appeal found that there were two issues in this
case. The first question was whether liability policies provide coverage
for exemplary damages which are awarded under Louisiana Civil Code
article 2315.4. If coverage can be found under such insurance policies,
the second issue is whether Louisiana public policy precludes such cov-
erage. 3 7
In addressing the first issue, the court in Creech noted that the first
,policy in question provided that the insurer would pay "all sums the
insured legally must pay as damages because of bodily injury or property
damage ... caused by an accident and resulting from . . . use of a
covered auto."3 The second policy provided that the insurer would pay
for "loss ... which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of A. Personal injury . . . -39 Based upon the
policy language and the fact that punitive damages under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2315.4 can only be awarded because of injuries, the
court determined that if the exemplary damages are owed because of
injury resulting from the conduct described in the article, then the insured
is legally obligated to pay such damagesY° The court further noted that
the insurance company could have easily avoided responsibility for ex-
emplary damages by excluding them from coverage under the policies.4'
The court also looked to the jurisprudence of other states and found
that most courts have construed similar policy language to provide
coverage.4 2 Finally, the court pointed out the settled rule that insurance
policies are to be construed "broadly in favor of coverage . . .and that
ambiguities are to be construed against the insurer. '43 Based on this
reasoning, the court held that the policies in question provided coverage.
36. 516 So. 2d 1168 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
37. Id. at 1170.








B. Does Insuring Against Punitive Damages Violate Public Policy?
Once it is determined that the policy does in fact provide coverage
for the insured's punitive damages, the court must then determine whether
insuring against punitive damages violates public policy. Therefore, the
court in Creech, after determining that the policies provided coverage,
turned to the issue of whether Louisiana public policy precluded the
insurance of punitive damages. The court agreed with Aetna that the
article was enacted to deter drunk driving, but disagreed that permitting
insuring against punitive damages would violate public policy. 44 After
referring to McNulty, Lazenby, Harrell, and Hensley, the court stated
that allowing insurance coverage for punitive damages would not "in-
crease the frequency of such acts any more than permitting insurance
coverage for ordinary negligent acts increases their frequency. ' 45 The
court concluded that wanton negligence is negligence all the same, and
public policy required that it not be precluded from insurance coverage.4 6
The court recognized that punitive damages have for their purpose
punishment and deterrence, but explained that they also provide addi-
tional compensation to the plaintiff for the wrong that has been done
to him. 47 The court noted that punishment and deterrence are not the
only public policies involved. Another important public policy is that
insurance companies should honor their obligations when they accept
premiums for insuring the insured against all liability for damages.4 1 In
the end, the court found that public policy does not preclude such
insurance and stated that "public policy is better served by giving effect
to the insurance contract rather than by creating an exclusion based on
a judicial perception of public policy not expressed by the legislature. '49
Leading the charge in opposition to the insurability of punitive
damages is the case of Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty0
in which the Fifth Circuit based its decision on public policy. This was
a drunk driver case, the fact of which may have influenced the court's
decision. Indeed, Judge Wisdom stated that "it [was] unnecessary to
construe the contract," and held that if a policy should provide spe-
cifically for such coverage, then it would contravene public policy. 51 In




48. Id. at 1174.
49. Id.
50. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
51. Id. at 434.
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determining what the Florida position12 on punitive damages had been
historically, the court found that Florida cases have followed the tra-
ditional notion that punitive damages exist to punish the defendant, to
deter similar conduct in the future, and not to compensate the victim."
The court also noted that no one would dispute the fact that a person
cannot insure himself against the risk of criminal fines or penalties
because such insurance coverage is against public policy. It then reasoned
that the same public policy should render void any insurance contract
against the civil punishment represented by punitive damages.5 4
The court continued its public policy argument by positing that
allowing one to insure himself against punitive damages would contravene
the punishment goal of imposing punitive damages. The court stated
this argument as follows:
The policy considerations in a state where ... punitive damages
are awarded for punishment and deterrence, would seem to
require that damages rest ultimately as well [as] nominally on
the party actually responsible for the wrong. If that person were
permitted to shift the burden to an insurance company, punitive
damages would serve no useful purpose. Such damages do not
compensate the plaintiff for his injury, since compensatory dam-
ages already have made the plaintiff whole. And there is no
point in punishing the insurance company; it has done no wrong.
In actual fact ... the burden would ultimately come to rest
not on the insurance companies but on the public, since the
added liability to the insurance companies would be passed along
to the premium payers. Society would then be punishing itself
for the wrong committed by the insured.55
This argument rests upon the basic notion that punitive damages are
meant to punish and deter rather than compensate. This concept of
punishment does not serve its intended purpose if the tortfeasor is
allowed to insure away the risk of this punishment. Indeed, by allowing
52. Note that the accident occurred in Florida; thus Florida law imposed the punitive
damages. However, the insurance contract was made and issued in Virginia, and, as such,
Virginia law governed the question of whether insuring against punitive damages contra-
vened public policy. However, the issue had not been resolved in Virginia so the court
looked "to the law imposing the punitive damages" (Florida law), to determine how the
Virginia courts would decide the issue. Id.
53. Id. at 435.
54. Id. at 440.
55. Id. at 440-41. See also Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (where
the court used almost the exact same logic to deny the insurability of punitive damages);
Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 39 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1934) (where the court stated
that since the insurance company did not participate in this wrong, the insured person
should not be allowed to recover from the innocent third party insurance company).
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the insurability of punitive damages, the dual legislative intent of pun-
ishment and deterrence is defeated. In the end, it is the innocent pur-
chaser of liability insurance who is ultimately punished because all
insurance rates are raised to compensate for the added risk associated
with punitive damages. Therefore, the only way to enforce the punish-
ment and deterrence policies behind the concept of punitive damages is
to deny the tortfeasor access to insurance to insulate against such a
penalty.
On the opposite side of the issue is Lazenby v. Universal Under-
writers Insurance Co. 16 which is the leading case in favor of public
policy allowing the insurability of punitive damages. After quoting the
McNulty opinion at length, 7 the Lazenby court offered a three-pronged
analysis for its opinion. In the first place, the court acknowledged the
fact that many automobile accidents are caused by drunk drivers, but
the court disagreed that the closing of the insurance market to these
drunk drivers would actually deter them in their wrongful conduct. 8
The court further asserted:
This State . . . has a great many detailed criminal sanctions,
which apparently have not deterred this slaughter on our high-
ways and streets. Then to say the closing of the insurance market,
in the payment of punitive damages, would act to deter guilty
drivers would in our opinion contain some element of specu-
lation.59
The second prong of the opinion focused on interpreting the policy
language to provide coverage for punitive damages. 60 The third basis of
the court's decision rested on the notion that there is a "fine line"
between simple, ordinary negligence and the type of negligence that will
allow an award of punitive damages. As a result of this fine line, a
person actually guilty of only simple negligence could be found guilty
of a higher degree of negligence and assessed with punitive damages.
Due to the risk that a person guilty of simple negligence could be
assessed punitive damages, the court determined that the insurance con-
tract must harm the public good or violate the Constitution to be void
as against public policy. Since the court determined that the insurance
contract did not harm the public good, the policy was not void as
against public policy. 61
56. 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964).
57. Id. at 3-4.
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21 for a discussion of this issue.
61. Lazenby, 383 S.W.2d at 5. The third prong of the Lazenby court's test is rather
poorly worded and one must infer that this is what the court intended.
19881
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Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court in determining that Arizona
law permits insuring against punitive damages followed the argument of
Lazenby by stating "there is no evidence that those states which deny
coverage have accomplished any appreciable effect on the slaughter on
their highways. "62 Thus the Arizona Supreme Court held in Price v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.63 that the clear, unequivocal lan-
guage of the policy required the insurance company to defend an action
based on the accident and to pay a judgment resulting therefrom, even
if such judgment includes an award of punitive damages.
The Oregon Supreme Court expanded on the Lazenby theory in
Harrell v. Travelers Indemnity Co.," by expressing the fear that even
gross negligence has been found to merit an award of punitive damages
in Oregon. 65 The court expressed the legitimate fear that punitive damages
would be assessed against people guilty of acts of negligence that fall
below the "wanton or reckless disregard" standard, thus exposing people
to punitive damage liability much more frequently. 66 Consequently, be-
cause of the fear that people would be liable for punitive damages much
more often than under the wanton or reckless disregard standard, the
court held that punitive damages are insurable in Oregon.
Later in the opinion, the Harrell court, after quoting from McNulty,
determined that it was "naive at least, if not pure fiction ' 67 to believe
that insuring against punitive damages violates public policy, because
the actual burden of the punitive damages is shifted to the insurance
company and eventually to the consumer. Instead, the court said that
insurance companies are free to charge additional premiums for those
people who choose to buy punitive damage insurance. 6 However, because
insurance companies do not offer a special punitive damages insurance
policy, the court determined that the standard automobile policy provided
coverage for punitive damages. The court further reasoned that gross,
reckless, and wanton negligence were nonetheless types of negligence,
and that a person should be allowed to insure against his negligence.
The argument assumes that there is no indication that increased reck-
lessness will result by allowing people to insure against punitive damages.
62. Price v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522, 524
(1972).
63. Id.
64. 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977).
65. Id. at 209, 567 P.2d at 1018. See also the resemblance to the third prong of the
Lazenby opinion.
66. Id. at 211, 567 P.2d at 1018-19. See the standard of conduct required for an
award of punitive damages in La. Civ. Code arts. 2315.3 and 2315.4.




Indeed, for years people have been allowed to insure against their own
negligence and this has not resulted in more negligent conduct.
69
The court's opinion in Hensley v. Erie Insurance Co. 70 provides
another viable reason to allow the insurability of punitive damages.
After discussing the arguments provided in Lazenby, Price, and Harrell,
the West Virginia Supreme Court refused to find that West Virginia
public policy precluded insurance coverage for punitive damages which
arose from gross, reckless or wanton negligence. 71 The court noted that
an insurance company is free to decline coverage for punitive damages,
and, even if they do provide such coverage, the insurance company will
still be liable only to the extent of its policy limits. However, the court
finally rested its decision upon the belief that it is unrealistic to argue
that punitive damages are assessed only to punish the defendant and
deter others in the future from engaging in similar behavior. The court
recognized that, in West Virginia, punitive damages are of a compen-
satory nature, and to disallow the defendant's ability to insure himself
against such damages would jeopardize the plaintiff's right to recover
such damages. 72
Therefore, the argument in favor of allowing the insurability of
punitive damages is essentially based on the notion that these damages
are granted in favor of the plaintiff and he should be able to recover
such an award. Additionally, not interfering with valid contracts unless
they violate some public policy is also a major plank in this argument.
This position provides that there is no valid public policy which would
support changing the terms of the contract, particularly to the disad-
vantage of the insured. Therefore the terms of the insurance contract
should not be disturbed. Finally, this argument relies on a somewhat
negative response to the McNulty decision that there is no proof that
disallowing the insurability of punitive damages has, in fact, actually
punished the particular defendant and deterred others in the future from
engaging in similar conduct. Since there are many criminal statutes which
attempt to punish and deter without any results, this leads to. the belief
that forbidding insurance to cover the imposition of a civil penalty will
not actually punish and deter.
IV. SHOULD LoUisIANA COURTS ALLOW THE INSURABILITY OF
PUNITIvE DAMAGES?
In order to determine whether the courts of Louisiana should allow
insurance of punitive damages, a bifurcated analysis should be used.
69. Id. at 207-08, 567 P.2d at 1017.
70. 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981).
71. Id. at 233.
72. Id.
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The primary question to be asked is whether typical policy language
would provide for such damages. A very strong argument could be
made for the proposition that the typical policy language does, in fact,
cover exemplary damages. Most policies provide basically that the insurer
will "pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of""7 bodily injury.
Punitive damages are sums which the insured is legally obligated to pay
as damages because they are money awards rendered against the insured
as damages by a court of law. The insured is required to pay an award
because he physically harmed the plaintiff, however slightly, and because
this injury gave rise to a cause of action against the tortfeasor-insured.
Even if it is determined that the phrase in the policy is ambiguous, it
is a basic rule in the construction of such a contract, that ambiguities
in an insurance policy are construed in favor of providing coverage for
the insured. Therefore, it can be seen that in all likelihood the policy
language provides for such damages. 74
The strongest argument in favor of allowing the insurability of
punitive damages is provided in Creech. There the court very persuasively
argued that if the legislature had intended to deny insurance coverage
for punitive damages, then it would have stated so in Louisiana Civil
Code article 2315.4."1 However, in the absence of a stated legislative
intent to the contrary, punitive damages, as damages caused by an
accident resulting in injury, are covered under the policy language.
Another argument in favor of allowing the insurability of punitive
damages is that the intent of these damages is to compensate the victim
rather than simply to punish the defendant. Indeed, this position was
espoused in Fagot v. Ciravolad6 where the court stated: "Indeed, to the
extent that Louisiana permits damage awards that other states would
term 'exemplary' or 'punitive,' Louisiana has relied on what may often
be viewed as the compensatory nature of even punitive damages. '"77 This
argument provides that if the insurability of punitive damages is dis-
allowed, then, in all likelihood, the plaintiff will not recover this element
of damages. The obvious question then becomes if the plaintiff was not
intended to receive the award, why was it granted to him in the first
73. See the policy in question in Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307
F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1962).
74. It should also be noted that, as stated in Lazenby, most courts, as a matter of
contractual interpretation of the language of the policy, construe the policy language to
cover both compensatory and punitive damages.
75. Creech v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1987).
76. 445 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1978).
77. Id. at 345.
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place. These exemplary damages have not been designated for any special
fund but rather they are given to the plaintiff because of his injuries.
Since these damages are given to the plaintiff as an element of his
damages, then he should not be denied the access to the insurance
company for recovery.
A third argument in favor of permitting the insurability of punitive
damages is the strong public policy of granting the victim access to a
pool of funds by way of the Louisiana Direct Action Statute."8 The
Direct Action Statute embodies a very strong public policy in favor of
the injured party because although the statute states the purpose of all
liability policies is to give protection and coverage to the insured, such
policies are executed in favor of injured persons. This illustrates the
paramount public policy in Louisiana that liability insurance is intended
to benefit the injured.7 9
Another argument favoring insurability is the problem of the def-
initions of "wanton" and "reckless disregard" used in Louisiana Civil
Code articles 2315.3 and 2315.4. As illustrated by the Oregon Supreme
Court in Harrell v. Traveler's Indemnity Co.,80 there is much confusion
over what constitutes wanton behavior or reckless behavior. It is possible
that a person actually guilty of gross negligence could be liable for
punitive damages because the fact finder decided that the tortfeasor's
conduct constituted wanton disregard for the safety of others. The
language is too ambiguous to deny a defendant liability insurance cov-
erage for his negligence. The fact remains that whatever modifier is
chosen, the person is still only guilty of negligence. Negligence has long
since been insurable and there is no reason to begin to attempt to decide
which types of negligence are insurable and which types are not.
Following the reasoning of the Arizona Supreme Court in Price,
there is no public policy to deny insurance coverage for these damages.
78. La. R.S. 22:655 (1978) provides in pertinent part:
The injured person or his or her survivors or heirs hereinabove referred to, at
their option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within the
terms and limits of the policy; and such action may be brought against the
insurer alone, or against both the insured and insurer jointly and in solido
It is also the intent of this Section that all liability policies within their terms
and limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons, his or her survivors
or heirs, to whom the insured is liable; and that it is the purpose of all liability
policies to give protection and coverage to all insureds . . . for any legal liability
said insured may have as or for a tort-feasor within the terms and limits of
said policy.
79. See W. McKenzie & A. Johnson, Insurance Law and Practice, in 15 La. Civil
Law Treatise (West 1986). See also Johnson, The Louisiana Direct Action Statute, 43
La. L. Rev. 1455 (1983).
80. 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977).
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There is no proof that denying this insurance coverage will lead to less
drinking and driving or fewer hazardous waste accidents. Indeed, the
majority of states allow such insurance and there has neither been a
sudden carnage on their streets nor has hazardous waste suddenly been
handled with callous disregard for others. No such carnage has occurred
because when people commit such wrongs, their insurance rates go up
or their insurance policy is cancelled. The threat of having one's in-
surance premiums raised is enough of a deterrent to make most people
act more responsibly. As the Lazenby court stated, if criminal statutes
do not deter people how can one realistically expect civil statutes to
punish and deter bad conduct?
The argument in favor of disallowing the insurability of punitive
damages looks first to the history of punitive damages in Louisiana.
One must consider the Summers and Hill cases in which the respective
courts referred to exemplary damages in a punitive sense. In Summers
v. Baumgard, the court stated that in illegally seizing and detaining the
plaintiff's horse and dray the defendant evinced "such an obstinate
determination .. .to take justice into his own hands, as fully authorised
[sic] the jury to make him pay-something in the shape of smart money."'"
In Hill v. The New Orleans, Opelousas and Great Western Railroad
Co., the court makes reference to "vindictive damages, as is sometimes
allowed in cases of wilful or malicious injuries. '"82 These two cases
illustrate that since exemplary damages were introduced into the Louis-
iana. jurisprudence, they have been used to punish people for reprehen-
sible conduct. To rebut the argument made in Fagot that exemplary
damages are of a compensatory nature in Louisiana, the case which
was cited to stand for this proposition need only be read. The case
cited was Loeblich v. Garnier"3 which discussed awarding mental anguish
damages under the title of punitive damages. Today mental anguish is
compensable, and thus, it does not need to hide under the guise of
exemplary damages. Therefore, the actual history of exemplary damages
in Louisiana illustrates the punishment theory behind the award of such
damages.
Another argument favoring the denial of insurability is to simply
read the language of the two statutes. Both Louisiana Civil Code articles
2315.3 and 2315.4 begin with the phrase, "[in addition to general and
special damages, exemplary damages may be awarded .... "84 This
phrase should dissipate all notions that exemplary damages in Louisiana
81. 9 La. 161, 163 (1836).
82. 11 La. Ann. 292, 294 (1856).
83. 113 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
84. For full text of La. Civ. Code arts. 2315.3 and 2315.4 see supra notes 1 and
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have any compensatory nature. The plaintiff is compensated for his
injuries through general and special damages. The exemplary damages
are awarded over and above the plaintiff's compensatory damages. The
restatement of torts also provides that punitive damages are those other
than compensatory damages and are awarded against a person to punish
him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others from
engaging in similar future conduct.85 If the definitions of punitive dam-
ages and compensatory damages are perused, it becomes apparent that
exemplary or punitive damages have no compensatory nature.8 6
A look at the legislative intent behind this article will also determine
the nature of these damages. When Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4
was proposed and presented to the House Committee on Civil Law and
Procedure, the bill's sponsor noted that many criminal statutes in the
past few years had been passed attempting to handle the problem of
the drunk driver. However, he lamented that Louisiana had not imposed
any civil penalties to attempt to sanction drunk drivers. House Bill 1051
which once enacted became Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4 was
designed to provide for civil penalties.87
85. See supra note 72.
86. According to Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979), compensatory and exemplary
damages are defined as follows:
Compensatory damages. Compensatory damages are such as will compensate
the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more; such as will sirkiply
make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury. Damages awarded
to a person as compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harm sustained by
him.
Exemplary or punitive damages. Exemplary damages are damages on an increased
scale, awarded to the plaintiff over and above what will barely compensate him
for his property loss, where the wrong done to him was aggravated by circum-
stances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud or wanton and wicked conduct
on the part of the defendant, and are intended to solace the plaintiff for mental
anguish, laceration of his feelings, shame, degradation, or other aggravations
of the original wrong, or else to punish the defendant for his evil behavior or
to make an example of him, for which reason they are also called "punitive"
or "punitory" damages or "vindictive" damages. Unlike compensatory or actual
damages, punitive or exemplary damages are based upon an entirely different
public policy consideration-that of punishing the defendant or of setting an
example for similar wrongdoers, as above noted. In cases in which it is proved
that a defendant has acted willfully, maliciously, or fraudulently, a plaintiff
may be awarded exemplary damages in addition to compensatory or actual
damages. Damages other than compensatory damages which may be awarded
against a person to punish him for outrageous conduct.
87. H.R. 1051, Reg. Sess. 1984 La. Acts No. 511. Rep. Bolin introduced House Bill
No. 1051 to the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure and stated the following:
You know, the Legislature has passed many criminal statutes in the last years
attempting to help, or attempting to address a problem with the intoxicated
driver on highway[s]; however, we have failed to pass any type of legislation
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Finally, in support of denying the insurability of punitive damages
in Louisiana, the solid reasoning provided for in McNulty should be
considered again. The court found that the underlying theory of punitive
damages in Florida is punishment and deterrence. The court went on
to state that if one is permitted to insure himself against punitive damages
then the basic premise behind such damages is destroyed. The tortfeasor
will not be punished because he does not have to pay any penalty.
Similarly, other drunk drivers in the future would continue to menace
the highways because they have not been deterred. The people who are
actually punished are the consumers whose rates would continue to rise.
Of course one can argue, as did the Lazenby court, that no one
has proven that denying insurance coverage for punitive damages has
actually served as a punishment or deterrence. However, it seems more
logical and consistent with the nature of punishments for the courts to
require proof that insurance coverage does not hinder the objectives of
punishment and deterrence of punitive damages before it allows one to
acquire such coverage." Also, as seen in McNulty, no one would argue
that a person can and should be allowed to insure himself against criminal
penalties since that would defeat the whole purpose of imposing such
a penalty. The same logic should be employed when discussing punitive
damages because they are civil penalties imposed for the purpose of
punishment. Like criminal penalties, punitive damages are imposed be-
cause society is outraged by the defendant's conduct and does not want
the defendant nor others in the future to commit the same offense. If
a person is permitted to insure himself against such damages, then the
policies of imposing a punishment and deterring similar future conduct
would be rendered impotent.
In determining whether Louisiana public policy would or would not
permit insuring against exemplary damages, the two punitive damages
statutes must be considered separately. Louisiana Civil Code article
2315.4 deals with conduct of the drunk driver for which society deems
punishment is warranted. On the other hand, Louisiana Civil Code
article 2315.3 involves, in all probability, a corporate defendant thus
encompassing the notion of vicarious liability and the issue of assessing
corporations with punitive or exemplary damages.8 9
that would provide for additional penalties in civil matters. That's what this
bill attempts to do.
88. See Comment, Torts-Insurance Coverage and Scope of Liability for Punitive
Damages, 58 Or. L. Rev. 263, 269 (1979).
89. In the situation of hazardous waste accidents, the plaintiff would likely not even
join the defendant employee in the suit because of the vicarious liability of the employer.
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If the purpose of assessing these damages is to punish and deter
then that policy can be accomplished much better in the Louisiana Civil
Code article 2315.4 situation because it involves one defendant engaged
in the conduct. However, with the corporate defendant, there is some
question as to whether an entity that is not even animate may be actually
punished. The actual individual tortfeasor would not necessarily be pun-
ished because it may not even be known who that is. The wanton or
reckless disregard for the public safety could be in a faulty decision
making process, or it could be in only one truck driver. Either way, a
corporation will ultimately be found liable, and forced to pay the ex-
emplary damages. Is it fair' to deny insurance to a defendant whose
only reason for being liable is its relationship to the actual tortfeasor?
If the policies behind the exemplary damages are punishment and
deterrence then it makes more sense when applied to the individual. In
this situation, there is one person guilty of culpable conduct and the
person assessed with the damages will be the one who actually committed
the wrong. He would actually be punished for his wrong and others
like him may well be deterred. It seems that article 2315.4 differs
substantially from article 2315.3 dealing with hazardous waste. In the
first situation a guilty tortfeasor is being assessed with the damages and
in the latter an entity is being assessed for the wrongs of one of its
employees. If punishment and deterrence are the goals of these articles
then the two code articles seem to be at war with each other. The
punitive nature of the damages seems entirely logical when dealing with
the intoxicated, guilty tortfeasor, yet it seems far from equitable to
attempt to punish a vicariously liable, non-negligent defendant. What
conduct is the corporation being punished for? What future conduct is
being deterred?
The root of the problem is in determining the policy behind the
assessment of exemplary damages. If these damages are to be labelled
as punitive damages, then they should be used to punish. A person
cannot be truly punished if he is allowed to insure himself against such
punishment. If the Louisiana legislature does not want to assess a
hazardous waste corporation with a penalty that the corporation cannot
buy insurance for, then the legislature should call these damages by a
different name or they should do away with punitive damages for
negligence in handling hazardous waste.
However, if the legislature intends to punish these corporations for
the negligence of corporate employees, then Louisiana Civil Code article
2315.3 should remain on the books, but it must be remembered that it
is not the corporation who actually committed the wrong. Regardless,
this discussion should be reserved for the legislature.9
90. Another issue arises when one contemplates what instructions should be given to
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It is this writer's opinion that the legislature enacted punitive damages
in order to punish people for anti-social behavior and to deter others
from engaging in similar behavior in the future. Even the Creech court
admitted that the purpose of Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4 is to
punish and deter. 9' Therefore this public policy should be implemented.
The best way to punish these tortfeasors and to deter others in the
future is to deny insurance coverage for these damages. The contrary
argument is that if criminal statutes do not deter people, then the denial
of insurance coverage cannot satisfy this policy of deterrence. This
argument is blind to the theory behind denial of insurance in this
situation. Instead of arguing that denial of insurance for punitive dam-
ages will not deter people because criminal statutes do not deter this
conduct, the argument should be that although criminal statutes have
not completely deterred this behavior, the denial of insurance for punitive
damages may well deter this conduct. There is not one iota of evidence
to prove that denial of insurance for punitive damages does not deter
drunk driving. However, in this writer's view, it is fairly certain that
if Louisiana permits the insurability of punitive damages, this conduct
will not be deterred. Individuals have been permitted to insure against
all damages arising- out of automobile accidents in the past, so there is
no reason to think that additional damages by another name will act
as a deterrent when this risk can also be insured against.
The courts of Louisiana should not simply throw their hands up in
the air and declare that drunk driving is a problem that cannot be
solved, and instead simply allow people to insure themselves against
these damages. Surely this was not the intent of the legislature when it
enacted Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4, nor is this the manner in
which the courts have traditionally resolved complex issues. On'the
contrary, the legislature clearly intended the article to punish and deter,
thus the courts should implement this legislative intent. There can be
no doubt that the most logical, reasonable, and realistic method of
implementing that intent of the legislature is through the denial of
insurance to those found liable for punitive damages under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2315.4.
C. Caldwell Herget Huckabay
the jury. Such issue merits extensive discussion thus it will be reserved for the legislature
or another comment.
91. Creech v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1987).
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